How long will it take to defeat India if China and India begin a war?

Hard to say, but we can look at the 1962 China-India border war.

With regard to the 1962 China-India border war, most people knew that the war had been won by China, but perhaps it was not known that the war had been imposed by China in a very harsh situation.

Even in an extremely harsh situation, the heroic Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PPL) still beat the Indo-Arab army to its teeth!

I would like to recall the history of the Chinese-Indian war, which I call “The Fairest War”.

I. BORDER CONFLICT

First of all, a brief reference to the origins of the border conflict between China and India.

As you know, India was the most important colony in Britain and was once dubbed the crown of Queen Victoria. During British colonization of India, care had been taken to improve the geopolitical environment of the colony.

The greatest threat to the geopolitical environment of India is from the North, where the Himalayas are subservient to the plains of the Indus, making it difficult for British colonists to sleep.

Topographic map of South Asia

The geopolitical dynamics of northern India are very similar to those of our period in northern Song.

At that time, the North Song Dynasty River was opened south, but the North Yan Yun 16 was occupied by the Liao state, from Yan Yun (now in Beijing) southward to the opening, and it was almost impossible to keep Pingchu on the road, leaving the North Song Dynasty under imminent military threat from the northern nomadic peoples, and then the capital city was conquered by the Golden State during the year of Yankang.

Therefore, the best way to improve India’s geopolitical posture in the north is to take down China’s Tibet and, if not, a large territory from the Tibetan border as a buffer zone in the northern plain of India.

Between October 1913 and July 1914, representatives of the United Kingdom, the Central Government of China and local representatives of Tibet met in Simla, British India, to discuss the status of Tibet.

During the conference, Foreign Minister McMahon of the British and Indian Government privately bribed representatives of the Chinese Tibet local Gagasha to arrange an exchange of border demarcation letters, the infamous McMahon line of the border between the British and Tibetan local government representatives.

This McMahon line has transferred 90,000 square kilometres of my land to India.

McMahon line map

This illegal exchange of demarcations has been kept secret by the British, but the paper cannot be contained, and was later firmly opposed by the Tibetan local government and the central Chinese government (then the Government of the North China).

So Britain itself did not use the McMahon line at the time.

Until 1936, the McMahon line appeared for the first time on a map of British India, labelled as “unmarked border”. However, even if it was not marked, it was opposed by China (which has become the Nanjing National Government).

During the Second World War, the British, who were known to be scavengers, took advantage of our country ‘ s total resistance to Japan ‘ s inability to take care of the border between China and India by sending troops to occupy the gate and the Chao region south of the McMahon line, resulting in the de facto occupation of parts of the south of the country.

Following India ‘ s independence in 1947, the Indian Government not only blatantly declared this illegal McMahon line to be the borderline in the Central and East India Sectors, but also in the Central and West Sectors of the Central and India Borders, where India ‘ s claims crossed the traditional borders of both sides in an attempt to seize our territory of 33,000 square kilometres in the West and Central Sectors.

Map of China-India territorial dispute

These are the origins of the territorial dispute over the border between China and India.

II. Failure of peace efforts

Because India has longed for our Tibetan territory, India has since been founded and has been making small movements along the border between China and India.

Here’s what India’s gradual invasion of my Tibetan territory in 1951-1958, where impatient readers can skip.

Eastern section of the border between China and India:

In February 1951, the Government of India, at the dawn of the new China, was busy in the interior with the issue of the border between China and India and the fight against the US-DPRK, sending more than 100 members of the Indian army across the West Shan River and the Davang River, usurping the capital of the Gate, and forcibly relocating the local government of Tibet in China, which had been exercising its authority there.

Before and after the invasion of Dawang, India also invaded areas such as the Margo, which is south of the wheat line. In October, one of the Indian troops, in cooperation with a helicopter, invaded the Yogi Barchasien and forcibly built a barracks in Mechuka and elsewhere.

By 1953, the Indian Army had largely invaded the gates, yoga, and bottom-up areas. On this basis, in 1954, the Government of India established the North-East Border District on 90.000 square kilometres of Chinese territory, south of the “wheat line” and north of the traditional customary line, and amended the official map and for the first time reclassified the “unmarked border” as “demarcated”, in an attempt to regularize and legalize the occupied Chinese territory.

Central Indian border section:

In addition to occupying the San, Onion and Sands occupied by British colonists, the Indian army invaded the Shanza, La Biti, Ugei fields in 1954; more than three Polin lands in 1955; the Shibucci River and a nearby meadow in 1957; and the hordes and tumultuous lands in 1958. As a result, the Indian side, in the middle of the Chinese-Indian border, jointly appropriated about 2,000 square kilometres of Chinese land.

West of the border between China and India:

Around 1951, the Indian Army took advantage of the fact that the Chinese army had just entered the area of Ali and appropriated approximately 449 square kilometres of land near the market for horses and dishes east of the muddy river; since 1954, the Indian Army has also invaded Vargas.

Until 1959, the disputed areas were under Indian control, with the exception of the area of Aksaichin in the western sector, which was largely under our de facto control.

In the diplomatic sphere, relations between States are complex.

On the one hand, India has encroached upon my Tibetan territory, but on the other hand it has maintained good relations with China at the international level, including being one of the first countries to recognize the new China, making a significant contribution to the advancement of the international status of the new China (the Mao Zedong assessment), and on the United Nations, which has been steadfast in its support for the return of the new China to its rightful seat, most of the time expressing its support for China’s struggle against the US Emperor.

For these reasons, the New China defines India as a friend who has always exercised restraint over India ‘ s encroachment on the border and hopes to resolve the border dispute between the two sides through peaceful negotiations.

However, as long as border disputes were involved, India ‘ s appetite was immediately opened.

In March 1959, our army won the war of counter-insurgency in Tibet, breaking down the social foundations of China and the illusion of India’s “buffering state” by the middle- and the foreign reactionary forces.

On 22 March 1959, on the day of the end of the war of counter-insurgency, Prime Minister Nehru of India officially wrote to Chinese Prime Minister Zhou En, presenting a large number of territorial claims.

Nehru is not only asking for the eastern part of the border which he has illegally occupied.” More than 900,000 square kilometres of Chinese territory south of the McMahon Line and 2000 square kilometres of Chinese territory along the central border are to be transferred to India, along with more than 33,000 square kilometres of territory in areas such as Aksaichin, which has been under the effective authority of my Government.

The demand that Nehru make a new China allocate 120,000 square kilometres to India is certainly unacceptable.

On 19 April 1960, Prime Minister Zhou, together with Foreign Minister Chen Yi, personally flew to New Delhi in preparation for the resolution of the border dispute between China and India with the utmost sincerity.

1960 Weekly Prime Minister Visit to India

Tolerance and restraint

China was in a very difficult time with internal distress!

At the international level, the United States imposed a comprehensive trade blockade on the new China, while at the same time engaging in a military standoff at the Golden Gate; in 1959, the Soviet Union not only destroyed all contracts for assistance to China, but also withdrew all the assistance experts from the Soviet Union, as a result of the long-wave radio and the United States fleet incident.

At the national level, the national economy is extremely difficult because of the national food shortage caused by the impact of the leap and large-scale natural disasters.

It was for these reasons that China did not have the capacity to wage war with India on the border between China and India, where logistical supply was difficult.

On the contrary, India was the leader of the global Non-Aligned Movement, and most developing countries in Asia and Africa supported India.

Because of India ‘ s enormous influence in developing countries, the United States and the Russian Federation had fought to bring India together to provide India with huge economic assistance, and the Soviet Union had even expressed its willingness to provide India with the arms it needed for the border war.

A source of internal distress.

A spring wind.

For these reasons, it was the lions of India who opened up and demanded 120,000 square kilometres of land from China.

As a result of the lack of interest in the negotiations between the two sides, India has lost the opportunity to take the best advantage of the Chinese-India border dispute.

After the collapse of the border talks between China and India, China has continued to exercise restraint at the border, and in order to avoid the use of fire in border conflicts, China has again withdrawn 20 kilometres from its de facto control of the border, where the Chinese border forces do not even patrol, hunt or attack.

India is moving fast on China’s tolerance and restraint.

When China retreated to India, it approached the Chinese border post and set up the post behind the Chinese post, then forced the Chinese border force to abandon the post and withdraw again.

From 1960 to 1962, China continued to endure for two more years, during which time India continued to encroach on Chinese territory.

Not only has the area of south of the McMahon line been fully occupied, but China ‘ s territory continues to be invaded across the McMahon line in multiple locations. At the border in the West Sector, India has also maintained an aggressive posture, forcing the Chinese border forces to retreat and encroaching on parts of my Aksaichin area, including the now disputed Galvan Valley area, and the Banghu Lake area, which was completely occupied by India.

China finally waited for a thousand times in 1962.

This is the Cuban missile crisis.

The Cuban missile crisis

In July 1962, the Soviet Union decided to deploy medium-range missiles in Cuba in secret and to supply it with Ir-28 jet bombers. The Soviet Union diverted cargo destined for Cuba to Soviet vessels and unloaded dozens of missiles and dozens of aircraft into containers for transport to Cuba. At the same time, 3,500 military technicians proceeded by boat.

Each missile carries a nuclear warhead 20 or 30 times larger than the atomic bomb in Hiroshima. The first disguised weapons arrived in Cuba on a merchant ship in late July.

It was not until 2 September 1962 that the Soviet Union publicly announced that it would supply weapons and technical experts to Cuba under an agreement between the two countries. At that time, the transport plan for Soviet weapons and experts was almost complete and deployment was nearing completion.

In October 1962, United States reconnaissance aircraft discovered medium-range missiles deployed in Cuba. The deployment of this near-middle missile poses a serious threat to the United States.

On the evening of 22 October 1962, at 7 p.m., Kennedy delivered a radio address to the United States and the world, informing them of the fact that the Soviet Union had deployed nuclear missiles in Cuba, declaring an armed embargo against Cuba and demanding that the Soviet Union withdraw the offensive weapons already deployed in Cuba under United Nations supervision.

Following Kennedy’s speech, the United States and the Soviet Union rose up and the world was in the shadow of nuclear war.

The sudden outbreak of the Cuban missile crisis has left the US and Sudu to no avail. After many years of indulging China has finally waited for a window of time to use force to counter the Indian invasion.

On October 1st, just before the Cuban missile crisis, India also had a code name. The attack plan in Ribot is to launch a large-scale military offensive to completely expel the Chinese army, which is “exposed to Indian territory”.

V. MIGRANT RESOURCES

War is not an impulsive decision for States.

The greatest difficulty in launching a self-defence counter-war at the border between China and India is also logistical.

At that time, Tibet had no railway, had only one environmentally harsh road to hide, had no road in many parts of the Chinese-Indian border, and all equipment, ammunition and food had to be sent to the border by manpower, a logistical condition that was bound to a very short and limited war.

So, can we defeat the Injun in a limited time?

President Mao asked that question.

As a result, it was unexpected that General Zhang Guohua, Commander of the Tibetan Military Region, had found it quite certain to defeat the Indian Army.

Why is our army so sure of a rival who has never fought?

As a general rule, either side must construct a well-established and well-equipped defence system.

It’s a very important defence system with a deep configuration.

For example, everyone has been to the cinema, where the seats are staggered, and this cinema is roughly a well-configured defence system.

The rationale for this is that when you attack the first platoon, the second two platoons will not only be able to quickly support the first platoon, but will also be able to protect the back of the first row, so that the enemy will not go around the back of the first row to trap the first platoon.

On the other hand, even if you have broken down the first row of defenses, with a number of rows of defenses behind them, and when your power of shock is always exhausted, this deep-seated defence system will ensure that even if the first rows are washed out, the entire defence system will not collapse.

But the results of the investigation into the deployment of the Indian Army have shocked me at the top of the army.

Because of the collapse of the Indian defense, it’s a leaking funnel!

We’ll use the cinema seat as a metaphor.

First Platoon, the largest deployment of Indian troops, but dispersed into isolated positions; and second and third, the seats were empty! The 4th Platoon has been re-deployed by the Indian Army at some points, followed by the 6th, 7th, 8th Platoon, and the 9th Platoon has been re-deployed at a number of points (there are operational maps later).

Such a strange defensive deployment would have provided our army with countless opportunities for interposition! And my army is exactly the best at penetrating the penetration tactics!

In the Korean battlefield, a volunteer armed with an absolute disadvantage is the ubiquitous penetration of the invincible United States army from the Green River to the 38th line. How can the deployment of the Indian Army now be more lax than that of the United States army?

So why is the deployment of the Indian Army so relaxed?

Four reasons.

The first is objective reasons.

The difficult terrain of the Chinese-Indian border, which, apart from the natural roads of several valleys, is either an empty snow mountain or an unventilated pristine forest, is a real and objective challenge for the construction of a complete defence system.

The second relates to Indian front commanders.

The commander of the Eastern Front of India is Lieutenant General Kaul, who has no real combat experience, but as a relative of Nehru, he served as Commander of the 4th Army in India’s Eastern War Area in 1962 and was responsible for the whole Eastern Front (the main battles against the Central and Indian Borders were fought on the Eastern Line, which was much smaller than the Eastern Line).

There was a very different voice within the Indian Army for Lieutenant General Kaul’s promotion too quickly, but it was ignored by the powerful Nehru.

Lieutenant General Kaul has a bad war skills, but he’s good at farting.

Before China launched a self-defence counter-war, the man himself, in order to “serve” Nehru’s birthday, commanded the front-line Indian army to take over one of our small hilltop positions at any cost, and after he had won this “winner”, Kaul was anxious to “give back” to Nehru.

Do you know how long it’s been written in this tabloid? This long “fast-line” gave the radio operator eight hours to record the longest message in the history of war.

Thirdly, it is related to India ‘ s high-level arrogance.

At the time, there was also opposition within the Indian army to the deployment of the Indian army, many of which were dispersed, but Nehru was arrogant and repeatedly stated to the military that “China will never wage war”.

This statement has made Lieutenant-General Kaul ‘s message’, so the Indian Army is not prepared to fight back in China.

Fourth, it has to do with the Indian army.

India, as a member of the Commonwealth, also participated in World War II, but the role of the Indian Army in the battles between Africa and Europe was essentially that of a saucer, either as a task of maintaining traffic lines or as a logistical struggle, with little participation in the battles.

After independence, a few battles were fought with Pakistan, but the intensity of the war in India and Pakistan seemed to us to be a home, and the whole Indian army was seriously under-experienced.

In addition, the Indian Army is also poorly organized, with high-caste officers serving as soldiers, and lower-caste soldiers, who are basically nobles and servants.

The military is highly polarized, its officers are corrupted and its soldiers are cattle and horses, and its cohesion and combat capacity are limited.

Because of the low organization of the army itself and the poor quality of the army, the Chinese army has not been able to do so in the harsh terrain where it considers itself unable to do so.

In the light of the above, the Indian Army has created a four-sided deployment of self-confidence and confidence in victory, and then it is no surprise that the Chinese army, which is at the height of light infantry in human history, was beaten on the ground.

VI. THE FAIRY OF THE CHINA ARMS

Let us now turn to the process of war, which is a textbook-style war that the Chinese army unilaterally performed, and a war in which the Indian Army is rubbing the ground.

In a sense, it’s a fine battle for the Chinese army.

The first was a counter-attack in the Keflang area.

Let us first look at the deployment of the Indian Army in this area.

The deployment of the Indian army and the Indian army’s assumption of our attack route.

This deployment of the Indian Army has not only collapsed, but has also reluctantly assumed that our forces can only push their battles along traditional lines of communication.

Because, in the view of the Indian Army, the rest of the area, except for the traditional lines of communication, is either a snow mountain at an altitude of more than 400 metres or a forest that is unventilated, and such a terrain force would never be able to pass.

But it’s exactly the kind of foot soldiers that can make force even in extreme terrain –

During the Red Army long march, our army was tested by various harsh terrains, such as snow mountains, grasslands, marshes, etc., and the Himalayas were truly harsh, but how could they be defeated by the heroic army?

We’re actually on the course of our counterattack in the Keflang area.

As you can see, the actual course of our attack has not been straight on the front, mostly through the back, from the sides or behind.

This is the punishment for the collapse of the Indian army! Let’s think of the metaphor of the previous cinema seat, the Chinese-Indian border war is almost like the Chinese army going around the back of the Indian Army, with a brick on the back of its head.

To be honest, how can our army have so many opportunities to fit behind American forces in the Korean battlefield?

The largest intruding operation in this war was the intertwining of many key chapters behind the Indian Army.

This interposition was carried out by a regiment in the Tibetan military region, which, because of the smooth fighting ahead of us, the rapid collapse of the first-line Indian army and the fear that the Indian army would run away, was forced to move quickly to Zhangdo to block the back road.

As a result, the group was blocked by a subtropical pristine rainforest on the road.

And it groweth in abundance, and its crowns are symmetrical, like a dome, and all kinds of vines and vines are a net of beads. The most painful is a rim of thorny trees, one tall, and a single inch of sharp thorns on the wreath, with a sharp edge of a wolf tooth.

The pioneers of the road have put all their energy into the thorny forest, cut it with firewood, hit it with a stick, blew it up with a grenade… However, the thorn forest is like a rubber wall, not only resilient but resilient.

The time was running out, and the last commander, General, took a bag over his head, jumped to the edge of the thorn forest and then jumped over his body.

Then one after another, following the example of the leader, forced the thorn forest out of the road with his own body, and allowed the rear troops to step through it on their own.

It should be recalled that for the soldiers under the forest, there are countless sharp stabbings of the forest, with nearly a thousand more people stepping through it than the most brutal torture.

In the end, 27 of the soldiers who put their body under pressure on the forest, four of them died.

It was with this incredible will that our army created a miracle of force for three days and two nights in this harsh terrain.

Upon arrival, the group launched a surprise attack, first to take down the 7th Brigade headquarters of the Indian Army, and then to ambush it, not only to block the army that had escaped from the front line, but also to encumber the prisoner of Brigadier General Arvi of the 7th Brigade of the Indian Army.

The battle against the Kraklang region was won.

On the eastern front, in the wider area (south of MacMahun), our troops performed better.

Eastern India’s deployment and the assumed route of our attack.

Let us first look at the deployment of the Indian Army, which is based on the assumption that the route of our attack is the same as that of the Kefiro area, that our forces will only attack directly along the traffic line and that they will lack basic protection of their flanks (General Kaul is a real scum).

But this time the Indian army is wrong.

We’re on the eastern line.

In this area of operations, our forces continue to engage in a wide-ranging run-back and infiltration campaign, and the attacks on the Indian Army have been largely abruptly bypassed (infiltration) to the flanks of the Indian military positions — that is, from areas where the army considers it absolutely impossible to cross.

Why would our troops go around the back of the Indies?

In addition to our heavy military capability in the harsh terrain, the lack of the necessary military deployment of the Indian Army in the deep terrain is a very important reason.

Because of the harsh terrain in the south of the country, it is certain that a large number of soldiers will be separated from the main forces in these harsh terrains, but the will of Chinese soldiers with the ideal of communism is very strong, and even the deserters who are separated from the main forces will emerge with remarkable fighting.

One of the deputy officers of the Tibetan military region, Pang Kuo-hyung, was separated from his troops in the west of the mountain, when he met three other “scramblings”, which were classified as “unmanned” in the professional army.

Then please see the Chinese deserters show…

Pang Guo Xing took the initiative to form a combat unit under Pang Guo Xing command, to be inserted 15 miles behind the enemy. Five consecutive battles, 5 units were destroyed, 2 artillery positions were destroyed, 7 were captured by a Canon howitzer alone, 8 were captured by a company, 24 were killed by the Pang Guo Xing group!

A group of “scramblings” took out most of the Indian field artillery, and this was a remarkable success.

After that, Pang spoke with great enthusiasm at the recognition conference of a famous phrase widely celebrated:

They didn’t surrender, they dared to fight back!

At the farthest distance from the battle was a battalion of the Tibetan military region that was penetrating at Bundira in the no-man’s zone on the ridge of the world.

7 For hundreds of kilometres in the middle of the night, forced troops rose by four snow hills over 4000 metres at minus 30-40 degrees, and suddenly appeared at the core of the Indian Army, as a result of the fall of the Berie trail, as if it were a miracle.

This plug-in is the same thing as the first row of the cinema is still fighting, and the last row of the army suddenly appears!

As a result, the presence of the Liberation Army in Bondira directly caused the collapse of the Eastern Line Indian Army.

The most amazing thing is that this force also created a fairy war on the Dolong bridge near Bondira, where there were no ancients.

After we were told that we had taken Bondira, the first battalion of the Madras United (to the fourth company) of the Indo-Indian Army was about 300 people who were rushing back from the Bondira Pass and arrived at the Dolong Bridge the next 10 hours.

There was only one battalion and a small 27-man unit across the bridge (with a 15-person mortar platoon).

27PK300, what choice would other professional armies make? It is estimated that 90 per cent of the options are evacuation, with a maximum of 10 per cent of the particularly tough choice to shoot (3 km from the Doron Bridge to Bondira, where our troops are recently present).

So what was the choice of our commander?

Round up this Indian army!

27 people, 300 people? You can’t even write science fiction like that!

Our commanders are so strong, and our soldiers have done so with a sense of peace.

And so a big circle began.

Deputy director Wang Wenbao’s rate was 2 men to block the front, 4 men (also TM artillery) to block the flanks, 5 more men to block the back roads, and the remaining soldiers (mainly artillery) to provide fire support to the artillery positions.

Look, there’s a total of 12 people surrounded by the “Major” behind the flank and the enemy. There’s only three on the front!

After the deployment, Wang Wenbao felt that three of his “power” were a little weaker, and went back to the battalion, and there was no one but a cooking class (7 people). So one gun from the cooker’s class was pulled up and raised the front.

So, 12 “Major Forces” plus 7 cookers went to a battalion in India. The battle ended in less than an hour, at the expense of three wounded men, killing 35 Indians, capturing 206 and destroying the first battalion of the Madras United.

This case demonstrates that the Indian army, which feels good, is a scum in my army’s eyes!

Because of the death toll in the pockets of the SLA after taking Bondira, the retreat of the Indian army, which led to the collapse of the front line, and the numerous scattered Indian troops, like ducks, marching around the pristine forest, made it more difficult for me to search the mountain and capture prisoners than to fight.

There is an interesting episode here, because several of the Indian brigade commanders followed the ultimatums into the mountains, making Lieutenant-General Kaul, Commander-in-Chief of the Indian East Front, nervous, and fearing that a few more officers of the Indian generals will be taken alive by our army — that is too humiliating.

So he personally took the helicopter to search for the Indian brigade commander, and was finally rescued by Lieutenant General Kaul.

The last rescue operation was a dangerous one, and it was almost as close as the Kaul bullet that was followed by the Kaul. If it had not been for the death of Lieutenant Kaul, who was last given a box of rice, Lieutenant General Kaul would have been captured by our army.

Press: I think India can make a film of Lieutenant-General Kaul’s rescue, which is called the Indian version of Hurricane Rescue.

There is a special reason why we have to fight harder on the west than on the east.

There is a provision in our Army’s self-defence counter-attack, which is strictly controlled in the disputed areas of China and India.

In other words, the scope of our operations is strictly controlled within the territory occupied by India, and the entire war of self-defence has been fought against, and none of our soldiers has stepped on Indian territory.

Because of the vast territory occupied by India and the fact that as many as 90,000 square kilometres of territory in the south of the McMahon line are occupied by the Indo-Indian Army, our troops have ample territorial access to the eastern line.

However, the fact that there are only a few incursions into our territory by the Indo-Indian Army on the Western Front has made it almost impossible for us to fight in the Western Front to make a tactical run back at the Indian Army position on the First Line, which has led to the limitation of our forces to a hard-and-hard offensive in a small area.

We’re on the west side.

Press: I’m not going to draw this western line, and you’re going to look at it, but it’s a short-strike battle.

For the above reasons, the western front counterattacks, although much smaller than the eastern front, have also been difficult in individual areas, with two separate battles.

One was fighting in the Galvan Valley (one of the places where clashes broke out along the border between China and India during the previous period, where more than twenty-one people died).

In 1962, our forces met here with a strong Indian Jett unit, a unit that had been in India for hundreds of years and that had been involved in the invasion of China by the British during the second opium war, which had been set on fire.

In the battle to capture the Galvan Valley, where the terrain limited our troops to a great sacrifice, there were 874 soldiers killed in action alone (more than 1,000 people were killed in action against India).

So, how could the Indian army have agreed to this point? This is from 1962, when more than 800 of my soldiers were killed.

Then Prime Minister Zhou found a special opportunity to report to Mao’s team’s “sweet history” and was so angry at Mao’s shooting that he called “a hundred years of national shame” and then issued a special message to the front-line commander that he had to wipe out the team, and no one had to slip through the net.

One was fighting at Banhung Lake (the focus of the recent border conflict between China and India).

Map of the situation around the Spangur Pass

In this battle, our forces seized the high ground on both sides of the Spangur Pass, thereby taking control of the Spangur Pass, which is directly facing the Indian Army, Chushul, as a front-line cantonment base, and amounts to a sharp knife to the throat of the Indian Army, which makes it difficult for the Indian Army to rest.

Later, after the self-defence counter-attack, our forces announced a unilateral withdrawal of 20 kilometres — but our forces did not withdraw from the high ground on both sides of the Pangur Pass and from the Galvan Valley.

This conflict along the border between China and India, the Indian military forces are demanding that our troops withdraw from the high ground on both sides of the Spangur Pass and give control of the Spangur Pass to the Indian Army — and, of course, it is a day-to-day dream.

In the previous period, Indian media reported that the Indian Army had seized the highlands on both sides of the Spangular Pass, and had the Indian people partying. All right, then it was discovered that this was a false report from the front-line forces, which was so strange.

The entire western front was fought, and our forces eventually uprooted 37 positions and expelled all of them from our territory.

VII. COMPREHENSIVE Victory

The glorious victory on the East-West front led to the total collapse of the front-line Indian Army.

In an effort to relieve the responsibility of failure, the Indian army’s frontline commander has exaggerated the strength of the Chinese army — our troops have invested no more than two divisions on the front line, and India’s front commander has boasted that “the Chinese army has invested more than a dozen divisions”.

Such a huge Chinese army has caused a panic in India — so many Indian parliamentarians believe that China’s military action was to occupy India.

On the eastern front, in Tispur, the major town of Assam, India, the Indian engineering forces began to implement the scorched earth policy, and the Indian engineering forces installed explosives in the city ‘ s bridges, factories, airports, oil depots to blow up all of them (later, the Indian engineering units had to drag and pull over because of their work, they had to hear from the radio about China ‘ s unilateral ceasefire and withdrawal before they could implement the scorched earth policy) – So Indian fatigue can sometimes play an unexpected role.

At the same time, the bank burned the currency, the robbers started looting and the urban order began to lose control.

On the western front, the crowds of New Delhi have not only been desperate to buy food, but the Government has also organized people to dig bomb shelters and large numbers of people have generally fled from New Delhi.

Just as India was in a state of panic, on November 21, China suddenly announced a unilateral ceasefire, not only to return its prisoners and weapons, but also to begin unilaterally to withdraw – and eventually to the de facto line of control before the war broke out.

The Chinese initiative to cease hostilities is aimed, on the one hand, at gaining the initiative of international public opinion, and, on the other hand, at the loss of much of the war materiel accumulated in the previous period.

Later, according to scholars, the Chinese-Indian border fought back for more than a month, and the Chinese army spent 3 per cent of the year’s revenues +, continuing to fight, even without taking into account climatic factors, the money could not afford it, knowing that in 1962 we had just survived three years of famine.

The news of a unilateral ceasefire in China saved the morale of India, which almost collapsed, but the country was a strange country. After learning that China had begun to withdraw, the Indian Parliament suddenly returned to a pre-war fever like a chicken hemorrhage, and countless parliamentarians shouted in their arms: China’s proposal for a ceasefire must not be accepted! India must fight with Chinese blood!

Nor did the Americans who had just passed the Cuban missile crisis in good faith encourage Nehru to continue the war, following the announcement by the United States not only of its recognition of the McMahon line, but also of its substantial military assistance to India.

At this point, the report of the new Indian Army Chief of Staff, General Chowdhury, calmed down Nehru, in which he said, “There is no alternative to a reciprocal response to the Chinese ceasefire. I’m sorry.

The report is, in fact, an acknowledgement of the total collapse of the front-line Indian Army and its total failure.

India ‘ s international prestige was reduced in 1962 by the China-India border war, and India ‘ s windy national transport began with its nation-building.

India’s military spending has been high since the tragic loss of the border war, with India spending at $70 billion in 2019, with GDP over 3 per cent, and its northern neighbours at just over 1 per cent last year.

On May 27, 1964, Indian President Nehru ended in depression.

In 2020, India took advantage of the US-China standoff at the border again, and Indian populism called: India today is not India in 1962!

Yes, India is not India in 1962, but China today is not China in 1962.

In 1962, India was largely a rank, and India might be a little stronger than China, when we were able to fight a textbook-style fairy war against the Indian Army only by virtue of the combined quality of our troops. Today, China is much more powerful than India.

If a military conflict breaks out along the border between China and India, even if the United States is holding up much of our strength along the south-east coast, we will be able to fill the gap with the Indian army.

In 1962, if we had been in hiding for 12 years since Tibet was liberated, if we had been in hiding for two years since Prime Minister Zhou went to New Delhi to negotiate, then a thunderstorm would have caused India decades of pain.

The longer we hold back on the border between China and India, the more terrible the fury will be in the future.

It was to be hoped that India ‘ s high-ranking elite would abandon its aggressive speculation at the border and allow peace and tranquillity at the border between China and India.

The author of this article: “Face cat brother file number: YX11oR9xLW8”

I don’t know.

Keep your eyes on the road.