What is the level of China in the game of great powers?
The battle for statehood, it was beautiful.
More than 70 years have passed since the division of the Korean peninsula began, and both Koreans and Koreans are used to it as if they were supposed to be two separate States.
However, in the long period following the end of World War II, Koreans did not think so.
It goes without saying that senior nationalists such as CHO and Kim Kyushu, including Kim Il Sung and Lee Sheng, are taken for granted for the reunification of Korea.
In particular, Kim Il Sung has a strong desire for reunification.
He knew, however, that it was by the power of the DPRK itself to defeat the American-backed South Korean army, which was nothing but a dream. Thus, from the very beginning, he placed this hope on the Soviet Union and frequently presented his unified ideas and demands to Stalin.
From 1948 to 1950, Stalin never agreed.
For the then Soviet Union, it was the most fundamental interest to ensure its own influence north of the 38th line, to maintain the status quo on the Korean peninsula and to avoid military confrontation with the United States. Therefore, Stalin has no interest in the unification of forces in North and South Korea.
Stalin’s idea is simple, and your lack of unity has nothing to do with me, but an attack on South Korea by force would definitely trigger American intervention and eventually lead to the fall of the Soviet Union into American war.
But at the end of January 1950, Stalin suddenly changed his mind, from opposing Kim Il Sung to supporting Kim Il Sung’s military adventure.
We need to look for clues from the time of the incident:
In November 1948, Kim Il Sung proposed a treaty of friendship and mutual assistance between the USSR and the DPRK, rejected by Stalin;
In March 1949, Kim Il Sung visited Moscow to propose elements of Korean reunification, which Stalin refused;
In September 1949, Kim Il Sung proposed a plan to take over the Korean Peninsula, which Stalin rejected;
At the end of October 1949, Stalin sent a message to China, clearly stating that he did not agree to the reunification of North Korea by force;
On 16 December 1949, Chairman Mao arrived in Moscow for a State visit and raised the issue of amending the Central-Soviet Treaty signed by the National Government that evening. Stalin directly refused;
On 2 January 1950, Stalin, under international circumstances and pressure, initially agreed to annul the old treaty and sign a new one;
On 22 January 1950, the formal negotiations between China and the Sudan began as an important part of the Treaty, and it was decided to return the ports of transit, Dalian and Middle East railways to China.
On 30 January 1950 Stalin telephoned Ambassador to the DPRK, Shtkov, to inform Kim Il Sung of his intention to assist him on the reunification of Korea.
From the end of October of 1949 to the end of January of 1950, in just a few months, Stalin’s attitude had changed by 180 degrees, and it seemed very confusing.
However, it is clear from the analysis of the various points and events:
The question is:
From a later analysis of the Soviet archives declassified by Russia, Stalin was a remarkable strategist whose plans, even now, seemed to be perfect.
For, according to him, whether North Korea eventually wins or fails, the winner will be the Soviet Union. It’s what he thinks.
He supported North Korea in launching a war against South Korea, with two outcomes.
As the elder brother of the DPRK and the largest backstage for the reunification of the DPRK, it is natural to offer to rent Incheon and Busan ports on the Korean peninsula.
So that the Soviet Union can make up for the loss of China’s terminal and Dalian port and continue to have Pacific-oriented access to the sea in the Far East!
With China’s weak air and sea forces to protect itself, only the Soviet Union can turn to for help, so that the Soviet Union can continue to maintain its military presence at the ports of Hong Kong and Dalian, and to have access to the Pacific Ocean!
What a brilliant design! Whether North Korea succeeds or loses, the Soviet Union eventually gets what they want.
When Stalin decided to support Kim Il Sung in a reunification war, Chairman Mao was in fact still in Moscow, but Stalin not only failed to inform the Chinese leader of his decision, but also specifically instructed Ambassador Shtkov in North Korea to tell Kim Il Sung to keep it confidential.
Stalin did so for the sole purpose of making rice and cooking and creating a fait accompli, leaving China with only one option:
By April 1950, Stalin had agreed to launch a military operation with Kim Il. It was then that Kim Il Sung had to go to China and obtain its consent before he could launch a reunification war. Stalin can’t be considered a hot move.
Kim Il Sung had to go to Beijing first, and 100 didn’t want to.
In fact, Kim Il-sung does not look down on China.
First, the DPRK, which was founded earlier than China, supported much of the CPC during the liberation war. Kim Il Sung thought he was in the socialist camp.
Second, New China is a poor country, it’s a waste of time. In Kim Il Sung’s eyes, there’s only the Soviet leg. China has nothing to offer.
Kim Il Sung knew about Stalin’s mind. I didn’t want to go.
Stalin said that the Asian revolution was a matter for the Chinese side to decide and that the Chinese side had to agree if it was to wage a reunification war.
Kim Il Sung went to Beijing with no will.
On 13 May 1950, Kim Il Sung arrived secretly in Beijing and held talks with Chinese leaders. Since the Chinese side was unaware of the outcome of the Kim Il Sung and Stalin negotiations, Chairman Mao could not believe his ears when he heard Kim Il Sung say that Stalin had agreed to initiate military action.
As a matter of caution, Zhou En went to the Soviet Embassy in China and sought confirmation from Stalin through the Ambassador as to whether this was true.
And Stalin called back:
“In view of the changed international situation, the Koreans have agreed to the proposal for reunification. At the same time, it is important that this issue be resolved by the Chinese and Korean comrades. If the Chinese comrades did not agree, the issue should be revisited. I’m sorry.
In the absence of a consensus between the Soviet Union and the DPRK, China could not put forward a veto at all.
Second, the main problem was that China had just signed a mutual aid treaty with the Soviet Union. If the Soviet Union was offended and the relevant assistance agreements could not be implemented, the new China that had just been established might face an extremely difficult situation.
China, for its part, had not made much commitment. And Kim Il-sung came with a mandate to say hello to the Chinese Communist Party and to go back to Stalin and tell him I’m done with Chinese comrades.
So the exact time of the operation and the plan were never mentioned with the CPC. He thought Stalin had promised, and the Soviet Union must have taken care of that late aid, and why should he have asked for this indescribable poor relative.
At a time when China was planning to march into Tibet, Xinjiang and to liberate Taiwan, it was not very interested in North Korea, but asked a few questions about equipment, and whether there were enough troops.
Kim Il Sung’s leg means you don’t have to worry. When Kim Il Sung returned to Korea, he had no further contact with the Communist Party.
Stalin did indeed equip the DPRK with large quantities of Soviet-made weapons, and the air force and armoured forces were fully equipped. At this time, hundreds of thousands of North Korean People ‘ s Army (NPA) are gathering on the 38th line, with only one word to say.
However, China and Kim Il Sung have agreed that they must inform China in advance when they will launch military operations.
Who would have thought this kid was so preposterous that he really didn’t look at the second brother of China?
On the third day after the Korean War, Kim Il Sung sent a schoolteacher to Beijing to brief him on the news, and Chairman Mao was very unhappy to say, “You also said that we have received information from French newspapers. This is a sign of Kim Il Sung’s arrogance.
On 25 June 1950, the Korean War broke out. On the same day, the United Nations Security Council convened an emergency meeting to request, through the United States, that the DPRK immediately withdraw its resolution north of the 38th line. North Korea refused.
At the United Nations Security Council on July 7, a resolution was adopted establishing the “United Nations Army” with MacArthur as Commander-in-Chief, with full involvement in the Korean War.
And the strange thing is that the Soviet Union was absent from the discussion of the Korean war. The Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Gromek, has asked Stalin many times to fear that if the Soviet Union does not participate in Security Council resolutions and uses the veto power, the United States will surely manipulate the United Nations to adopt the resolution on North Korea.
Stalin, however, did not agree with the representative of the USSR to the United Nations. Gromic thought Stalin was a little emotional, but…
He was thinking of two things. If the Soviet Union were to participate in the Security Council resolution on the United States formation of a United Nations force to intervene armedly in the DPRK, only two options would be agreed and rejected.
As a result, Stalin was optimistic about the United States armed intervention in North Korea and was within his strategic plan.
After Kim Il Sung launched a full-scale offensive against South Korea, Li Seung-sung, who kept his mouth shut, broke into Seoul on the third day.
The pompous Kim Il Sung has advanced all the way to the south with the intention of taking over South Korea in full before the arrival of American troops, creating a fait accompli and forcing the United States to recognize the outcome of the reunification of Korea.
If that were true, it would be a good thing that we in China would not have to participate in this war.
At that time, China had yet to complete its national liberation and was organizing troops to liberate Tibet and recover Taiwan.
In addition to the fact that the Korean People ‘ s Army was well on the way to fighting, the Chinese Government at this time did not consider the issue of sending troops to Korea and remained focused on internal affairs.
On 15 September 1950, MacArthur launched an amphibious landing war, code-named “Operation Iron Chromium”, in Incheon, cutting off the rear supply line of the Korean People’s Army and creating a siege on the People’s Army. The situation in the Korean war has changed dramatically. KPA troops failed and were driven back north of the 38th line in a few days.
On September 30, Kim Il Sung sent a request for help to Stalin in the hope that the Soviet Union would be able to “direct military assistance” – not just to supply weapons, but to engage the Soviets directly in the war. But Stalin turned it down.
Stalin went on to call the Chinese Government, pretending that “I am taking leave away from Moscow and have little knowledge of the situation in North Korea (in fact it should be). But from the report that Moscow has given me today, I have learned that comrades in Korea are in trouble. It is hoped that the Chinese comrades will be able to provide support, even for five or six divisions, and have deliberately concealed the information that Kim Il Sung requested direct military support from the Soviet Union.
What an old fox!
After receiving a telegram from Stalin, the central Chinese Communist Party was caught by surprise and there was intense internal debate, with the vast majority of the population tending not to fight.
The reason is simple:
The first newly established State is in the throes, and the first task is to restore the economy as soon as possible.
The second is that the equipment and the U.S. military are not in the same class, that the Air Force and the Navy are virtually non-existent.
It is also a dilemma.
As a strategic master named Stalin, Chairman Mao saw Stalin’s calculations clearly. Can’t he understand what’s happening in China? But he knew that, if he did not go to war, he would lose far from what he could see.
So he said, “You must fight.” “It is a great benefit to participate in the war and a great harm to not participate in the war.”
Why didn’t you go to the war?
First, if North Korea loses, there will be no buffer zone in the new China. China’s north-east border will face the threat of American forces, and it will be under the US siege.
Second, the new Central-Soviet Union has just been established, and economic construction, with Soviet assistance, has not yet begun. It was all the more important at the time to gain the confidence of the Soviet Union and to maintain relations between Central and Soviet countries. New China needs the Soviet Union much more than the Soviet Union needs China.
On 5 October 1950, at an expanded meeting of the Political Bureau, with the support of Pendwright, the decision was taken on 15 October to enter the Democratic People ‘ s Republic of Korea with the Pendwyer Forces, although the debate remained intense.
This is indeed a difficult choice for China. One vs. 16, for a poor, white new China, is truly a fire.
However, China won.
During the Korean War, the Chinese volunteer forces invested in successive operations in the Democratic People ‘ s Republic of Korea totalled 1.9 million and the total number of casualties reached 390,000. In contrast, the Korean People ‘ s Army invested only 137,000 troops in total. China paid a great price and saved the DPRK.
There’s a metaphor, “The Soviets planted this onion, the Americans pulled it out, the Chinese planted it back.”
China had paid a great price in the Korean war, but for the new China the Korean war was of great significance and was a war for statehood.
When the new China was founded, Chiang Kai-shek was brought to Taiwan by a small family. The poor agricultural base and the largely non-existent industrial system have created enormous difficulties for the economic recovery of the new China.
As a result, the new China has opted for one-sided diplomatic tactics, which have completely reversed to the Soviet Union and obtained from it the technology, equipment and funds necessary for economic construction. However, the Soviet Union has no confidence in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union because of its history of great discomfort. It remains unclear whether the Treaty of Mutual Assistance between the Sino-Soviet Alliance of Friendship can be fully implemented.
China’s active participation in the Korean War has changed all of this.
China ‘ s participation in the war and its heroic performance on the Korean battlefield have earned the Soviets great respect. The Soviet Union had also seen, through the Korean War, the determination of China to fall to the communist camp, and had dispelled the concern that China would become a second Yugoslavia.
Thus, from 1952 onwards, a series of treaties and agreements signed by the two parties quickly entered into the implementation phase. The Soviet Union had made a significant contribution to the recovery of the national economy of New China by providing loans, industrial equipment, agricultural machinery, etc., and sending a large number of Soviet experts to China to teach technology to the Chinese people.
China ‘ s first five-year plan was also developed and implemented by the Soviet Union. In accordance with the agreement between the two parties, by 1959 the Soviet Union would have assisted China in 141 industrial projects. In October 1954, at the request of the Chinese Government, 15 additional projects were added. During the “1 5 ” period, the Soviet Union assisted 156 industrial enterprises in China.
This is the famous 156 items.
One hundred and fifty-six industrial projects essentially cover the industrial systems that a country needs, and China is joined by an agricultural country. Its coverage and level of support have not been, and are not expected to be, in the history of the world.
After the Soviet Union’s Second World War, it was a real disaster. Under such difficult conditions, the Soviet Union had indeed spared no effort to assist the new China, and many of its core technologies had been delivered in great measure. So whatever has happened between Central and Soviets, we are grateful to the Soviet Union on this point.
From the end of the Qing Dynasty until the establishment of the new China, it was essentially a disgrace. Whether the Qing Government or the warlord were intermingled, until the National Government and the Powers signed a large number of pacts on the sale of power and humiliation, the foreign war was almost unwinnable.
The Korean War changed the world’s perception of China. When Chinese volunteers entered the Democratic People ‘ s Republic of Korea, no country in the world, including the Soviet Union, would believe that the new China would win the United States.
Military power is far too wide.
The two armies are fighting for strength. The combination of military equipment from one side to another is far too different.
But the Chinese People ‘ s Volunteer Army, with its strong will and spirituality, forced Americans to the negotiating table.
The world is shaken. Even the United States, in its summary of the Korean War, said, “It is no longer the weak and incompetent country in World War II.”
The socialist countries of Eastern Europe, like the Soviet Union, were full of mistrust towards China, and through this war China was admired, greatly increasing its international voice.
Stalin was launched in the context of the Soviet Union ‘ s national interests during the Korean War, without taking into account the risks to which China was exposed.
For China, it was a highly risky gamble.
God bless China, China wins.
What is the level of China in the game of great powers? – The cat owner’s sharp-eyed answer.
I don’t know.
Keep your eyes on the road.
